Ask the market by Vanessa Sumo
E
very week, the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) produces a five-color map, each color
representing the gravity of the flu in each state, from
yellow (no activity) to red (widespread activity). It’s useful
so far as it goes, but the information is often a week old.
There might be a way to gather timelier information. 
Say that a nurse in a public health clinic in North Carolina
usually sees about one or two patients come in each day with
flulike symptoms in the month of December. But one day
that number goes up to four, and then to five the following
day. Sensing that the flu was quietly spreading, the nurse
places a bet that the CDC will upgrade the state’s flu alert
from green (sporadic activity) to purple (local activity) or
even to blue (regional activity). A doctor, a lab technician, a
pharmacist, a nursing student, and other traders in the flu
prediction market likewise throw in their hunches, based 
on their own observations. Together, they come up with
their best prediction of how widespread the flu will be in the
coming weeks.
The University of Iowa has been running such a flu 
prediction market for the state of Iowa for the past four
years. During the October 2006 to April 2007 flu season, it
added a new market for North Carolina because of strong
interest from state epidemiologists.
Here is how it works. Each participant is given 100 “flu
dollars” with which to trade. This amount is equivalent to a
real money educational grant of $100, which grows or
shrinks during the season depending on the accuracy of their
predictions. Participants buy and sell five color-coded
shares, or contracts, each one corresponding to a level of flu
activity based on the CDC’s surveillance system. 
For instance, if the price of a red contract that expires in
two weeks is 80 flu cents, then the market’s collective guess
is that there is an 80 percent probability that the flu will 
be widespread in a couple of weeks. If many traders believe
likewise, then they will buy more red contracts, hence 
bidding up its price. Thus, the market price of each contract
indicates the likelihood that the spread of the seasonal bug
will reach a certain level in a particular week. If the CDC
eventually reports a “red week,” then those holding on to red
contracts will be rewarded one flu dollar. Contracts of losing
bets expire worthless. Participants get a check at the end of
the season depending on how well they did.
Predictions from the Iowa flu market (where there are
more data to analyze) have been remarkably accurate. About
half of the time, it has been able to correctly predict the
extent of flu activity one to two weeks in advance, according
to a study by the managers of the flu prediction market. The
record is even better if allowed some wiggle room. “Doctors
say we don’t have to be exactly right, they just want to know,
for instance, that [the prediction] is green rather than red,
and we’re [correct] there 90 percent of the time,” says
George Neumann, an economist at the University of Iowa
and one of the market’s managers. 
The value of such a prediction market is that one can
often get a very good idea of how severe the flu season will
be, even up to five weeks in advance. That’s enough time for
health care workers to spring into action — to mobilize
resources toward vaccinating high-risk individuals and to
prepare hospitals to anticipate more patients.
The principle behind prediction markets is simple. 
By designing contracts for which payoffs depend on some
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offer incentives for people to reveal
what they know, and then pool this
information to produce the best fore-
cast. Prediction markets provide an
effective way to bring together what
writer James Surowiecki calls the “wis-
dom of crowds.” His book (which
bears the same title) is a treatise 
on how the collective intelligence of
people is often better at predicting the
future, and, therefore, at making 
better decisions, than calling on a few
experts. This claim has been shown 
to be true in many domains. In the
case of flu prediction markets, 
epidemiologists are happy to tap into
the wisdom of anyone from doctors to
nursing students.
Political and media uproar a few
years ago about a Department of
Defense-funded project has somewhat
frozen interest in using these markets
for public policy. One of two appoint-
ed projects, the Policy Analysis
Market (PAM), was accused of being a
market for predicting when the next
terrorist attack would occur, some-
thing that was thought to be offensive
and morally wrong. PAM was promptly
shut down even before it was launched. 
In fact, PAM was a market that
would have allowed traders to specu-
late, for instance, on how the country’s
financial aid and military involvement
would affect economic and political
stability in the Middle East, and how
conditions in those countries could
affect the United States. “It wasn’t a
market about terrorist attacks,” says
Robin Hanson, an economist at
George Mason University and one 
of the architects of PAM. But it 
might have demonstrated how well
these markets can make forecasts 
in comparison with other means of
gathering intelligence.
With the demise of PAM, public
policymakers may have become 
hesitant to adopt prediction markets.
“The government got shy,” says
Hanson. Instead, companies are 
leading the way, turning to 
the power of these markets to peer
into the future to help them make
better decisions.  
The Market as a Crystal Ball
Prediction markets have been used to
forecast election and sports outcomes,
the weather, Oscar winners, future
technologies, the direction of the fed
funds rate, and almost any event that
people care about. It is tempting to
look at these markets as just a fancy
form of gambling or an entertaining
pastime. But as a new book on infor-
mation markets (another name for
prediction markets) by the AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies notes, these markets are begin-
ning to acquire some respect. They
seem to deliver forecasts that are as
good as or even better than other well-
known prediction mechanisms.
For instance, the Iowa Electronic
Markets (IEM), a prediction market
institution at the University of Iowa
for almost two decades, has consis-
tently done a better job at calling the
winners of presidential elections than
opinion polls. One of the contracts
offered at the IEM allows traders to
bet on a candidate’s share of the total
votes, which makes it easy to compare
the market’s prediction to the actual
vote share won by each nominee.
These contracts pay off a penny for
each vote share earned by a candidate.
For instance, if the democratic nomi-
nee gets 40 percent of all democratic
and republican votes, then that 
contract pays 40 cents. The markets
are open to all traders, except for some
“classroom markets” that are limited
to academic traders. 
Joyce Berg and Thomas Rietz, both
of the University of Iowa, have studied
the performance of the IEM so far.
They find that on the eve of the elec-
tion, the predicted presidential vote
shares missed the actual vote shares by
1.33 percent. This is smaller than the
average error of 2 percent for opinion
polls (for elections prior to 2004).
Moreover, Berg and Rietz find that
IEM prices for the 2004 presidential
elections were  “more stable than polls,
respond less to transient events than
polls, and were closer to election 
outcomes than the average poll when 
the election was more than one 
week away.” 
The IEM is probably the best place
to search for proof on the 
forecasting ability of these markets
because it has been around for a long
time. The evidence is still coming in
from other corners of the field, but the
results look encouraging so far. One
piece of evidence comes from
data for the first two and a half
years of Economics Derivatives,
a prediction market that bets on
the future path of economic 
variables like nonfarm payrolls and
retail sales. A recent analysis by Refet 
Gürkaynak of Bilkent University in
Turkey and Justin Wolfers of the
University of Pennsylvania shows 
that market-based forecasts “mildly 
dominate” the consensus forecasts of
professional economists working in
financial markets. 
The power of prediction markets
to successfully aggregate and summarize
information relies a great deal on giving
participants monetary incentives to
truthfully reveal their beliefs, in mak-
ing people “put their money where
their mouth is.” This reward entices
people to come forward and trade, to
toss their bets and information in the
ring. The more confident a trader is in
his beliefs, the bigger his bet, thus 
giving more weight to what he knows.
Because he will be rewarded for 
being correct, a trader will have 
the incentive to constantly watch 
the markets and to jump on any 
opportunity when prices fall out of
line with their predictions. He will 
also be motivated to continually seek
information to improve upon his bets
and therefore the market’s forecasts. 
The Fed, for instance, can look 
at various surveys of inflation expecta-
tions, something that it is keen on
following because it directly affects its
decision on where the fed funds 
rate, its monetary policy instrument, 
will go. However, as a San Francisco Fed
Economic Letter points out, “survey esti-
mates suffer a bit from the ‘talk is
cheap’ problem.” A better way is to 
look at what the market thinks the
future course of inflation will be. 
One indicator is the difference
between the rate of return on 
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return on inflation-indexed bonds: a
measure of the public’s expectations of
inflation. The prices of these financial
instruments will always represent the
market’s best forecast. There is every
incentive not to lie because there is
money at stake. Consequently, the 
difference in yields between these two
instruments has been shown to be 
better predictors of inflation than 
survey-based estimates.
But does money always matter in
prediction markets? This question is
especially important in the United
States where gambling is mostly illegal,
which makes it difficult to set up a pre-
diction market that involves real
money. The prediction market puzzle
is that even markets trading in pretend
dollars can make very accurate predic-
tions, which seems to undermine 
the profit motive that makes these
markets work so well. 
For instance, the Hollywood Stock
Exchange, a play money site, has been
shown to have a very good record 
of predicting Oscar winners and box-
office successes. Even when the stakes
are limited such as at the IEM, which
trades with real money but has an
investment limit of $500, accuracy has
not suffered. (The IEM can legally
operate with real money because it has
been given a “no action” letter from
the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, on condition that it does
business in a way that it has indicated
to the commission, including accepting
an investment no greater than $500
for each participant.) 
Why do play money prediction
markets do as well? In real money 
markets, the quality of the informa-
tion or the skill of the trader is
reflected in the amount he is willing to
bet. However, the amount he is willing
to put down can be determined in part
by the depth of his pocket. In a play
money world, however, one can make
large bets only after amassing a fortune
of play money, which in turn is only
possible by making a series of good
trades. This feature may help make up
for any accuracy that could be lost by
not trading with real money. 
And there are other reasons that
could motivate people to trade on 
the information that they have. In
companies that run internal predic-
tion markets, for instance, managers
would probably never ask employees
to put up their own money. “What we
come to think of as real money is when
[employees] pay out of their own
pocket to participate. And inside the
company, that usually doesn’t happen,”
says Emile Servan-Schreiber, CEO 
and co-founder of Baltimore, Md.-
based NewsFutures, a firm that 
sets up internal prediction markets 
for companies. 
While businesses sometimes pro-
vide some small monetary rewards like
cash or gift certificates, reputation or
recognition within the group could be
a stronger incentive. “Your perform-
ance in the market is going to reflect
well upon you in the minds of the
higher-ups, which is probably more
important than the material reward,”
say Servan-Schreiber. Another factor
is how much the employee cares about
the event to be predicted in the 
market. (For instance, will product X
be launched on time?) “If you care
about the question because it’s part of
your job and you think you know a lot
about it, then that will be its own
reward,” Servan-Schreiber says.
Markets vs. Meetings
A good forecast is extremely 
valuable for companies, one 
that translates into better
decisions and higher profits.
Google is running internal
prediction markets to 
predict product release dates. Arcelor
Mittal, the largest steelmaker in 
the world, has one to forecast sales and
the price of steel. The pharmaceuticals
industry has also been keen on predic-
tion markets because choosing a new
drug to place its money on can be very
risky. “The problem of  a pharmaceutical
company is that it has many ideas that
it could bet on, but it needs to bet on
the right one early on, otherwise 
it could be wasting billions of 
dollars on the wrong course,” 
Servan-Schreiber says. 
In companies, just like in any
organization, there is a lot of informa-
tion that managers may find helpful,
and the challenge lies in how to bring
the pieces of the puzzle together. 
Of course, probably the oldest and the
most widely used method, the staff
meeting, is one way to get everyone in
the same room and exchange what
they know, says Wolfers, but this is
probably not the best way to extract
what employees really believe. 
Someone who is only interested 
in pleasing his boss might say what he
believes the boss wants to hear, in
which case his information is useless
and even distracting. Nobody wants to
be the bearer of bad news, so someone
who might think that a project will 
not be launched on time will hold back
saying so. And then there is the insuf-
ferable employee who will say his
opinion about everything but in fact
knows nothing. And in the corner at
the back of the room there may be
someone who is uncomfortable about
speaking up but really knows a lot. 
In this type of situation, the 
information that is laid out in front of
the manager will be erroneously
weighed according to who has the
loudest voice or who wants to curry
the most favor with the boss, which is
surely not the best way to aggregate
information. Prediction markets offer
a better way by giving employees
equal opportunity to place
bets on their beliefs and 
have what they know count
more according to how strong their
opinions are. 
But who gets to participate in the
company’s internal prediction market?
Should it be limited to the smartest
guys in the room? The problem is that
companies often do not know who the
smart guys are; if they did, then they
would just go up to them and ask.
Prediction markets make it possible
for experts to step forward and reveal
themselves. “We may be surprised that
the guys from the loading dock are
actually the ones who know how many
orders went out that week,” says
Wolfers. “So I wouldn’t want to
exclude the loading guy ever, because
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who knows that.” 
But what happens if those who
think they are experts but really 
are not likewise come forward? This
actually makes it even more appealing
for the smart guys to trade. “You can
think about uniformed money as sort
of the honey that attracts the bees,”
says Wolfers. “It’s the reward for 
intelligence and good trading.” 
Similarly, manipulators, or those
who would lose trades intentionally to
move prices in their favor, can also be
thought of as “noise” traders. For
instance, if a company rewards
resources to a division based on what
prediction markets say, then employ-
ees may be tempted to try to
manipulate prices. However, it is 
the nature of markets to offer rewards
to those who spot these “noises” 
early on.
ANot-So-Scary Proposition
Besides manipulation, there are other
circumstances when prediction mar-
kets might fail to yield the right
forecast. Markets may be biased
toward “favorites” and “long shots,” or
the tendency to undervalue near 
certainties and overvalue small proba-
bilities. Prediction “bubbles” may also
be possible if investors irrationally
inflate the probabilities of certain 
outcomes. These anomalies are not
different from those observed in
financial markets. Also, if the quality
of available information is very poor,
then the prediction will simply reflect
the market’s collective ignorance.
But no system of forecasting is
error free, and so the relevant question
is how the errors of this mechanism
compare to the errors of other 
forecasting mechanisms. So far, pre-
diction markets have done at least as
well as the alternatives. 
Even so, prediction markets are not
meant to prematurely replace other
methods of forecasting and gathering
information, if at all, but can initially
take on an advisory role. “We don’t
have to put the market directly in
charge, [but] you would slowly rely on
it as you came to trust its judgment
more,” says Hanson. Hence, it is
important to continue to compare 
the accuracy of prediction markets
with alternative institutions. That may
assuage some fears of handing 
over an organization’s decisionmaking 
capabilities entirely to the market,
especially in the arena of public policy. 
And there are many uses for public
policy. Just like company managers,
the problem a policymaker faces is
how to find those who will truthfully
reveal their beliefs about a certain 
policy and how to best aggregate and
weigh those beliefs. One clever way is
to design a set of contracts that can be
traded in prediction markets to allow
policymakers to compare the outcome
of competing policies, or what Hanson
calls “decision markets.” For instance,
decision markets can be used to 
compare murder rates with and 
without capital punishment, children’s
test scores with and without school
choice, road congestion with and
without the expansion of a highway,
and a host of other public-
choice questions.
Will governments ever use predic-
tion markets in this way? Perhaps, but
not soon. “Many useful institutions
took a long time to become adopted,”
says Hanson. Life insurance is one
such institution, which took awhile to
become accepted because people
thought that life insurance was like
gambling on death, and that put 
people off. The unlawful Internet 
gambling law that was passed last year
may also inadvertently affect predic-
tion markets from flourishing, insofar
as these markets are seen as gambling.
In the business world, interest in
prediction markets is growing fast
even if the acceptance is a little slower,
mostly because it takes awhile to 
see results. But Servan-Schreiber is
optimistic about their place in 
corporate circles. “Prediction markets
are going to become a fixture of 
management in the 21st century.
That’s pretty sure,” he says.
“[Prediction markets] work and
there’s a demand out there for the 
wisdom of crowds.” RF
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